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Abstract. In this paper we propose a technique for verification of mo-
bile systems. We translate finite control processes, which are a well-known
subset of pi-Calculus, into Petri nets, which are subsequently used for
model checking. This translation always yields bounded Petri nets with
a small bound, and we develop a technique for computing a non-trivial
bound by static analysis. Moreover, we introduce the notion of safe pro-
cesses, which are a subset of finite control processes, for which our trans-
lation yields safe Petri nets, and show that every finite control process can
be translated into a safe one of at most quadratic size. This gives a pos-
sibility to translate every finite control process into a safe Petri net, for
which efficient unfolding-based verification is possible. Our experiments
show that this approach has a significant advantage over other existing
tools for verification of mobile systems in terms of memory consumption
and runtime.
Keywords: finite control processes, safe processes, pi-Calculus, mobile
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1 Introduction
Mobile systems permeate our lives and are becoming ever more important. Ad-
hoc networks, where devices like mobile phones, PDAs and laptops form dy-
namic connections are common nowadays, and the vision of pervasive (ubiquit-
ous) computing, where several devices are simultaneously engaged in interaction
with the user and each other, forming dynamic links, is quickly becoming a
reality. This leads to the increasing dependency of people on the correct func-
tionality of mobile systems, and to the increasing cost incurred by design errors
in such systems. However, even the conventional concurrent systems are notori-
ously difficult to design correctly because of the complexity of their behaviour,
and mobile systems add another layer of complexity due to their dynamical
nature. Hence formal methods, especially computer-aided verification tools im-
plementing model checking (see, e.g., [CGP99]), have to be employed in the
design process to ensure correct behaviour.
2 R. Meyer, V. Khomenko, T. Strazny
The pi-Calculus is a well-established formalism for modelling mobile systems
[Mil99,SW01]. It has an impressive modelling power, but, unfortunately, is dif-
ficult to verify. The full pi-Calculus is Turing complete, and hence, in general,
intractable for automatic techniques. A common approach is to sacrifice a part of
the modelling power of pi-Calculus in exchange for the possibility of fully auto-
matic verification. Expressive fragments of pi-Calculus have been proposed in
the literature. In particular finite control processes (FCPs) [Dam96] combine an
acceptably high modelling power with the possibility of automatic verification.
In this paper, we propose an efficient model checking technique for FCPs.
We translate general FCPs into their syntactic subclass, called safe processes. In
turn, safe processes admit an efficient translation into safe Petri nets — a well-
investigated model for concurrent systems, for which efficient model checking
techniques have been developed.
This approach has a number of advantages, in particular it does not depend
on a concrete model checking technique, and can adapt any model checker for
safe Petri nets. Moreover, Petri nets are a true concurrency formalism, and so one
can efficiently utilise partial-order techniques. This alleviates the main drawback
of model checking — the state space explosion problem [Val98]; that is, even a
relatively small system specification can (and often does) yield a very large state
space.
Among partial-order techniques, a prominent one is McMillan’s (finite pre-
fixes of) Petri Net unfoldings (see, e.g., [ERV02,Kho03,McM92]). They rely on
the partial-order view of concurrent computation, and represent system states
implicitly, using an acyclic net, called a prefix. Many important properties of
Petri nets can be reformulated as properties of the prefix, and then efficiently
checked, e.g., by translating them to SAT. Our experiments show that this ap-
proach has a significant advantage over other existing tools for verification of
mobile systems in terms of memory consumption and runtime. All the missing
proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 Basic Notions
In this section, we recall the basic notions concerning pi-Calculus and Petri nets.
2.1 The pi-Calculus
We use a pi-Calculus with parameterised recursion as proposed in [SW01]. Let
the set N
df
= {a, b, x, y . . .} of names contain the channels (which are also the
possible messages) that occur in communications. During a process execution the
prefixes pi are successively consumed (removed) from the process to communicate
with other processes or to perform silent actions. The possible prefixes are
pi ::= a〈b〉 p a(x) p τ.
The output action prefix a〈b〉 sends the name b along channel a. The input action
prefix a(x) receives a name that replaces x on channel a. The τ prefix stands for
a silent action.
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To denote recursive processes, we use process identifiers from the set PIDS
df
=
{H,K,L, . . .}. A process identifier is defined by an equation K(x˜) := P . When
the identifier is called, K⌊a˜⌋, it is replaced by the process obtained from P by
replacing the names x˜ by a˜. More precisely, a substitution σ = {a˜/x˜} is a function
that maps the names in x˜ to a˜, and is the identity for all the names not in x˜.
The application of substitution, Pσ, is defined in the standard way [SW01]. A pi-
Calculus process is either a call to an identifier, K⌊a˜⌋, a choice process deciding
between prefixes,
∑
i∈I pii.Pi, a parallel composition of processes, P1 | P2, or the
restriction of a name in a process, νa.P :
P ::= K⌊a˜⌋ p
∑
i∈I pii.Pi p P1 | P2 p νa.P .
The set of all processes is denoted by P. We abbreviate empty sums (i.e., those
with I = ∅) by 0 and use M or N to denote arbitrary sums. We also use the
notation Πni=1Pi for iterated parallel composition. Processes that do not contain
the parallel composition operator are called sequential. We denote sequential pro-
cesses by PS , QS and the identifiers they use by KS . An identifier KS is defined
by KS(x˜) := PS where PS is a sequential process. W.l.o.g., we assume that
every process either is 0 or does not contain 0. To see that this is no restriction
consider the process a〈b〉.0. We transform it to a〈b〉.K⌊−⌋ with K(−) := 0.
The input action a(b) and the restriction νc.P bind the names b and c, re-
spectively. The set of bound names in a process P is bn (P ). A name which is not
bound is free, and the set of free names in P is fn (P ). We permit α-conversion
of bound names. Therefore, w.l.o.g., we assume that a name is bound at most
once in a process and bn (P )∩ fn (P ) = ∅. Moreover, if a substitution σ = {a˜/x˜}
is applied to a process P , we assume bn (P ) ∩ (a˜ ∪ x˜) = ∅.
We use the structural congruence relation in the definition of the behaviour
of a process term. It is the smallest congruence where α-conversion of bound
names is allowed, + and | are commutative and associative with 0 as the neutral
element, and the following laws for restriction hold:
νx.0 ≡ 0
νx.νy.P ≡ νy.νx.P
νx.(P | Q) ≡ P | (νx.Q), if x /∈ fn (P ).
The last rule is called scope extrusion. The behaviour of pi-Calculus processes is
then determined by the reaction relation → ⊆ P × P defined by the following
rules:
(Tau) τ.P +M → P
(React) (x(y).P +M) | (x〈z〉.Q+N)→ P{z/y} | Q
(Const) K⌊a˜⌋ → P{a˜/x˜}, if K(x˜) := P
(Par)
P → P ′
P | Q→ P ′ | Q
(Res)
P → P ′
νa.P → νa.P ′
(Struct)
P → P ′
Q→ Q′
, if P ≡ Q and P ′ ≡ Q′.
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By Reach (P ) we denote the set of all processes reachable from P by the reaction
relation. We use a client-server system to illustrate the behaviour of a pi-Calculus
process. It will serve us as a running example throughout the paper.
Example 1. Consider the process C ⌊url⌋ | C ⌊url⌋ | S⌊url⌋ modelling two clients
and a sequential server, with the corresponding process identifiers defined as
C (url) := νip.url〈ip〉.ip(s).s(x).C ⌊url⌋
S (url) := url(y).νses.y〈ses〉.ses〈ses〉.S⌊url⌋.
The server is located at some URL, S⌊url⌋. To contact it, a client sends its
ip address on the channel url , url〈ip〉. This ip address is different for every
client, therefore it is restricted. The server receives the IP address of the client
and stores it in the variable y, url(y). To establish a private connection with
the client, the server creates a temporary session, νses, which it passes to the
client, y〈ses〉. Note that by rule (React), y is replaced by ip during the system
execution. Thus, the client receives this session, ip(s). Client and server then
continue to interact, which is not modelled explicitly. At some point, the server
decides that the session should be ended. It sends the session object itself to
the client, ses〈ses〉, and becomes a server again, S⌊url⌋. The client receives the
message, s(x), and calls its recursive definition to be able to contact the server
once more, C ⌊url⌋. The model can contain several clients (two in our case), but
the server is engaged with one client at a time. ♦
Our theory employs a standard form of process terms, the so-called restricted
form [Mey07]. It minimises the scopes of all restricted names νa not under
a prefix pi. Then processes congruent with 0 are removed. For example, the
restricted form of P = νa.νd.(a〈b〉.Q | b〈c〉.R) is νa.a〈b〉.Q | b〈c〉.R, but the
restricted form of a〈b〉.P is a〈b〉.P itself. A fragment is a process of the form
F ::= K⌊a˜⌋ p
∑
i∈I 6=∅ pii.Pi p νa.(F1 | . . . | Fn),
where Pi ∈ P and a ∈ fn (Fi) for all i. We denote fragments by F or G. A
process Pν is in the restricted form, if it is a parallel composition of fragments,
Pν = Πi∈IGi. The set of fragments in Pν is denoted by Frag (Pν)
df
= {Gi | i ∈ I}.
The set of all processes in restricted form is denoted by Pν .
For every process P , the function (−)ν computes a structurally congruent
process (P )ν in the restricted form [Mey07]. For a choice composition and a
call to a process identifier (−)ν is defined to be the identity, and (P | Q)ν
df
=
(P )ν | (Q)ν . In the case of restriction, νa.P , we first compute the restricted
form of P , which is a parallel composition of fragments, (P )ν = Πi∈IFi. We
then restrict the scope of a to the fragments Fi where a is a free name (i.e.,
i ∈ Ia ⊆ I): (νa.P )ν
df
= νa.(Πi∈IaFi) | Πi∈I\IaFi.
Lemma 1. For every process P ∈ P it holds (P )ν ∈ Pν and P ≡ (P )ν . For
Pν ∈ Pν we have (Pν)ν = Pν .
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If we restrict structural congruence to processes in restricted form, we get the
restricted equivalence relation ≡̂ . It is the smallest equivalence on processes
in restricted form that permits (1) associativity and commutativity of parallel
composition and (2) replacing fragments by structurally congruent ones, i.e.,
F | Pν ≡̂G | Pν if F ≡ G. It characterises structural congruence [Mey07]:
Lemma 2. P ≡ Q iff (P )ν ≡̂ (Q)ν .
2.2 Petri Nets
A net is a triple N
df
= (P, T,W ) such that P and T are disjoint sets of respectively
places and transitions, and W : (P × T ) ∪ (T × P ) → N
df
= {0, 1, 2, . . .} is a
weight function. A marking of N is a multiset M of places, i.e., M : P → N.
The standard rules about drawing nets are adopted in this paper, viz. places
are represented as circles, transitions as boxes, the weight function by arcs with
numbers (the absence of an arc means that the corresponding weight is 0, and an
arc with no number means that the corresponding weight is 1), and the marking
is shown by placing tokens within circles. As usual, •z
df
= {y | W (y, z) > 0}
and z•
df
= {y | W (z, y) > 0} denote the pre- and postset of z ∈ P ∪ T , and
•Z
df
=
⋃
z∈Z
•z and Z•
df
=
⋃
z∈Z z
•, for all Z ⊆ P ∪ T . In this paper, the presets
of transitions are restricted to be non-empty, i.e., •t 6= ∅ for every t ∈ T . A net
system is a pair Υ
df
= (N,M0) comprising a finite net N and an initial marking
M0.
A transition t ∈ T is enabled at a marking M , denoted M [t〉, if M(p) ≥
W (p, t) for every p ∈ •t. Such a transition can be fired, leading to the marking
M ′ with M ′(p)
df
= M(p) −W (p, t) +W (t, p), for every p ∈ P . We denote this
by M [t〉M ′ or M [〉M ′ if the identity of the transition is irrelevant. The set of
reachable markings of Υ is the smallest (w.r.t. ⊆) set [M0〉 containing M0 and
such that if M ∈ [M0〉 and M [〉M ′ then M ′ ∈ [M0〉.
A net system Υ is k-bounded if, for every reachable marking M and every
place p ∈ P , M(p) ≤ k, and safe if it is 1-bounded. Moreover, Υ is bounded if it
is k-bounded for some k ∈ N. One can show that the set [M0〉 is finite iff Υ is
bounded. W.l.o.g., we assume that for net systems known to be safe the range
of the weight function is {0, 1}.
3 A Petri Net Translation of the pi-Calculus
We recall the translation of pi-Calculus processes into Petri nets defined in
[Mey07]. The translation is based on the observation that processes are con-
nected by restricted names they share. Consider the fragment νa.(K⌊a⌋ | L⌊a⌋).
As the scope of a cannot be shrunk using the scope extrusion rule, the restricted
name a ‘connects’ the processes K⌊a⌋ and L⌊a⌋. The idea of the translation is
to have a separate place in the Petri net for each reachable ‘bunch’ of processes
connected by restricted names, i.e., the notion of fragments plays a crucial role
in the proposed translation. The algorithm takes a pi-Calculus process P and
computes a Petri net PN [[P ]] as follows:
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– The places in the Petri net are all the fragments of every reachable process
(more precisely, the congruence classes of fragments w.r.t. ≡).
– The transitions consist of three disjoint subsets:
• Transitions t = ([F ] , [Q]) model reactions inside a fragment F , where Q
is such that F → Q and [F ] is a place (i.e., F is a reachable fragment).
These reactions are communications of processes within F , τ actions,
or calls to process identifiers, K⌊a˜⌋. There is an arc weighted one from
place [F ] to t.
• Transitions t = ([F | F ] , [Q]) model reactions between two structurally
congruent reachable fragments along public channels, i.e., F | F → Q
and [F ] is a place. There is an arc weighted two from [F ] to t. If this
transition is fired, F contains a sequential process sending on a public
channel and another one receiving on that channel, and there are two
copies (up to ≡) of F in the current process.
• Transitions t = ([F1 | F2] , [Q]) model reactions between reachable frag-
ments F1 6≡ F2 along public channels: F1 | F2 → Q and [F1] and [F2] are
places. There are two arcs each weighted one from [F1] and [F2] to t.
The postsets of each kind of transitions are the reachable fragments in the
restricted form of Q. If the fragment G occurs (up to ≡) k ∈ N times in
(Q)ν , then there is an arc weighted k from ([F ] , [Q]) to [G]. For example,
from the transition (
[
τ.Π3i=1K⌊a⌋
]
,
[
Π3i=1K⌊a⌋
]
) there is an arc weighted
three to the place [K⌊a⌋].
– The initial marking of place [F ] in the Petri net PN [[P ]] is determined by
the number of fragments in the restricted form of P which are congruent
with F .
Note that if it is known in advance that the resulting Petri net will be safe, then
no transition incident to an arc of weight more than one can fire, and so they can
be dropped by the translation (in particular, the second kind of transitions will
never appear). This fact can be used to optimise the translation of safe processes
defined in Section 5.
It turns out that a pi-Calculus process and the corresponding Petri net ob-
tained by this translation have isomorphic transition systems [Mey07]. Hence,
one can verify properties specified for a process P using PN [[P ]]. Returning to
the running example, we explain how this translation yields the Petri net in
Figure 1(a) for the process in Example 1.
Example 2. Initially, the system consists of the server process and two clients,
C ⌊url⌋ | C ⌊url⌋ | S⌊url⌋. Since the URL where the server is located is public,
the server and the clients do not share a restricted channel. Therefore, we have
three fragments, namely two copies of C ⌊url⌋ and S⌊url⌋. They are represented
by two separate places p1 and p2 as the two client fragments are structurally
congruent. Place p1 initially contains two tokens, M0(p1) = 2, as there are two
copies of the fragment C ⌊url⌋ in the initial process.
The client can be replaced by the process in its defining equation, and so
the place p3 =
[
νip.url〈ip〉.ip(s).s(x).C ⌊url⌋
]
is created. This is modelled by
transition t1 = ([C ⌊url⌋] ,
[
νip.url〈ip〉.ip(s).s(x).C ⌊url⌋
]
) connecting p1 and
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p3. Similarly, transition t2 models the replacement of the server identifier S .
It connects p2 and p4 = [url(y).νses.y〈ses〉.ses〈ses〉.S⌊url⌋]. Now the client is
ready to contact the server. This interaction is modelled by transition t3 =
(
[
νip.url〈ip〉.ip(s) . . . |url(y).νses.y〈ses〉 . . .
]
,
[
νip.(ip(s) . . . | νses.ip〈ses〉 . . .)
]
).
There are arcs weighted one from p3 and p4 to t3, as each of the correspond-
ing fragments is included once in
[
νip.url〈ip〉.ip(s) . . . | url(y).νses.y〈ses〉 . . .
]
.
The postset of t3 is the class p5 =
[
νip.(ip(s) . . . | νses.ip〈ses〉 . . .)
]
. Note that
this fragment represents a local connection of the client and the server by the
restricted name ip. Thus, one token on this place stands for two processes shar-
ing a restricted channel. In the next step, the server passes the session object
to the client and forgets its ip address, which is modelled by transition t4 =
(
[
νip.(ip(s) . . . | νses.ip〈ses〉 . . .)
]
, [νses.(ses(x) . . . | ses〈ses〉 . . .)]) with postset
p6 = [νses.(ses(x).C ⌊url⌋ | ses〈ses〉.S⌊url⌋)]. Since the communication between
the client and the server session is not explicitly modelled, transition t5 =
([νses.(ses(x).C ⌊url⌋ | ses〈ses〉.S⌊url⌋)] , [C ⌊url⌋ | S⌊url⌋] with t•5 = {p1, p2} ter-
minates the current session and returns the system to the initial state. ♦
4 Boundedness of FCP Nets
For general pi-Calculus processes, the translation presented in the previous sec-
tion may result in infinite Petri nets, and even when the result is finite, it
can be unbounded, which is bad for model checking. (Model checking of even
simplest properties of unbounded Petri nets is ExpSpace hard.) To make veri-
fication feasible in practice, we need bounded nets, preferably even safe ones (the
unfolding-based verification is especially efficient for safe nets), and so we have
to choose an expressive subclass of pi-Calculus which admits efficient verification.
In this section, we investigate the translation of the well-known finite control
processes (FCPs), a syntactic subclass of the pi-Calculus [Dam96]. FCPs are
parallel compositions of a finite number of sequential processes PS i, PFC =
νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn), and so new threads are never created and the degree of
concurrency is bounded by n. The main result in this section states that the Petri
net PN [[PFC ]] is bounded, and a non-trivial bound can be derived syntactically
from the structure of PFC . The intuitive idea is that k tokens on a place [F ]
require at least k processes PS i in PFC = νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) that share some
process identifiers.
To make the notion of sharing process identifiers precise we define orbits.
The orbit of a sequential process PS i consists of the identifiers PS i calls (both
directly and indirectly). With this idea, we rephrase our result: if there are at
most k orbits in PFC whose intersection is non-empty then the net PN [[PFC ]] is
k-bounded.
Generally, the result states that the bound of PN [[PFC ]] is small. If PFC =
νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) then PN [[PFC ]] is trivially n-bounded, as the total number
of orbits is n. Often, our method yields bounds which are even better than n.
This should be viewed in the light of the fact that for general bounded Petri
nets the bound is double-exponential in the size of the net [Esp98]. This limits
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p1
p2
t1
t2
p3
p4
t3 p5 t4 p6 t5
p1 = [C ⌊url⌋]
p2 = [S⌊url⌋]
p3 =
[
νip.url〈ip〉.ip(s).s(x).C ⌊url⌋
]
p4 = [url(y).νses.y〈ses〉.ses〈ses〉.S⌊url⌋]
p5 =
[
νip.(ip(s).s(x).C ⌊url⌋ | νses.ip〈ses〉.ses〈ses〉.S⌊url⌋)
]
p6 = [νses.(ses(x).C ⌊url⌋ | ses〈ses〉.S⌊url⌋)]
(a)
p1
p2
p3
t1
t2
t3
p4
p5
p6
t4
t5
p7
p8
t6
t7
p9
p10
t8
t9
p1 =
[
C 1⌊url⌋
]
p2 =
[
S3⌊url⌋
]
p3 =
[
C 2⌊url⌋
]
p4 =
[
νip.url〈ip〉.ip(s).s(x).C 1⌊url⌋
]
p5 =
[
url(y).νses.y〈ses〉.ses〈ses〉.S3⌊url⌋
]
p6 =
[
νip.url〈ip〉.ip(s).s(x).C 2⌊url⌋
]
p7 =
[
νip.(ip(s).s(x).C 1⌊url⌋ | νses.ip〈ses〉.ses〈ses〉.S3⌊url⌋)
]
p8 =
[
νip.(ip(s).s(x).C 2⌊url⌋ | νses.ip〈ses〉.ses〈ses〉.S3⌊url⌋)
]
p9 =
[
νses.(ses(x).C 1⌊url⌋ | ses〈ses〉.S3⌊url⌋)
]
p10 =
[
νses.(ses(x).C 2⌊url⌋ | ses〈ses〉.S3⌊url⌋)
]
(b)
Fig. 1. The Petri nets corresponding to the FCP in Example 1 (a) and to the corres-
ponding safe process in Example 4 (b).
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the state space in our translation and makes such nets relatively easy to model
check.
The intuitive idea of the orbit function is to collect all process identifiers
syntactically reachable from a given process. We employ the function ident :
P → P(PIDS ) which gives the set of process identifiers ident(P ) that are in the
process P ∈ P:
ident(K⌊a˜⌋)
df
= {K}
ident(
∑
i∈I pii.Pi)
df
=
⋃
i∈I ident(Pi)
ident(P | Q)
df
= ident(P ) ∪ ident(Q)
ident(νa.P )
df
= ident(P ).
The orbit of a process P , orb(P ), is the smallest (w.r.t. ⊆) set such that
ident(P ) ⊆ orb(P ) and if a process identifierK with a defining equationK(x˜) :=
Q is in orb(P ) then ident(Q) ⊆ orb(P ). The maximal number of intersecting or-
bits of a process PFC = νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) is
#∩(PFC)
df
= max
{
|I| | I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and
⋂
i∈Iorb(PS i) 6= ∅
}
.
The main result of this section can now be stated as follows.
Theorem 1. PN [[PFC ]] is #∩(PFC)-bounded.
Example 3. Consider PFC = C ⌊url⌋ | C ⌊url⌋ | S⌊url⌋ in Example 1. We have
orb(S⌊url⌋) = {S} and orb(C ⌊url⌋) = {C} for both clients. Thus, #∩(PFC) = 2,
and so the corresponding Petri net PN [[PFC ]] in Figure 1(a) is 2-bounded. This
is an improvement on the trivial bound of 3 (i.e., the number of concurrent
processes in the system). ♦
We spend the rest of the section proving this result. We start with a sketch of
the proof. The Petri net PN [[PFC ]] is k-bounded iff in every reachable process
Q ∈ Reach (PFC) there are at most k fragments that are structurally congruent.
Thus, we need to show that the number of structurally congruent fragments
is bounded by #∩(PFC) in every reachable process Q. To do so, we assume
there are k fragments F1 ≡ . . . ≡ Fk in Q and conclude that there are at least
k intersecting orbits in PFC , i.e., #∩(PFC) ≥ k. We argue as follows. From
structural congruence we know that the identifiers in all Fi are equal. We now
show that the identifiers of the Fi are already contained in the orbits of different
PS i in PFC . Thus, the intersection orb(PS1)∩ . . .∩ orb(PSk) is not empty. This
means that we have found k intersecting orbits, i.e., #∩(PFC) ≥ k.
To show ident(Fi) ⊆ orb(PS i) we need to relate the processes in every reach-
able fragment with the initial process PFC = νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn). To achieve
this, we prove that every reachable process is a parallel composition of sub-
processes of PS i. These subprocesses are in the set of derivatives of PS i. The
derivatives are defined by removing prefixes from PS i as if those prefixes were
consumed.
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Definition 1. The function der : P → P(P) assigns to every process P the set
der(P ) as follows:
der(0)
df
= ∅
der(K⌊a˜⌋)
df
= {K⌊a˜⌋}
der(
∑
i∈I 6=∅ pii.Pi)
df
= {
∑
i∈I 6=∅ pii.Pi} ∪
⋃
i∈Ider(Pi)
der(P | Q)
df
= der(P ) ∪ der(Q)
der(νa.P )
df
= der(P ).
Consider an FCP PFC = νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn). We assign to every PS i the
set of derivatives, derivatives(PS i). It is the smallest (w.r.t. ⊆) set such that
der(PS i) ⊆ derivatives(PS i) and if KS⌊a˜⌋ ∈ derivatives(PS i) then der(PS) ⊆
derivatives(PS i), where KS(x˜) := PS . ♦
Using structural congruence, every process reachable from PFC can be rewritten
as a parallel composition of derivatives of the processes in PFC . This technical
lemma relates every reachable process with the processes in PFC .
Lemma 3. Let PFC = νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn). Then every Q ∈ Reach (PFC)
is structurally congruent with νc˜.(Q1σ1 | . . . | Qmσm) such that there is an
injective function inj : {1, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . , n} with Qi ∈ derivatives(PS inj (i))
and σi : fn (Qi)→ c˜ ∪ fn (PFC).
For the derivatives Q of PS it holds that the identifiers in Q are in the orbit of
PS . Combined with the previous lemma, this relates the identifiers in a reachable
fragment and the orbits in the initial process.
Lemma 4. If Q ∈ derivatives(PS) then ident(Q) ⊆ orb(PS).
By an induction along the structure of processes we show that for all P ∈
P the following holds: if Q ∈ der(P ) then ident(Q) ⊆ ident(P ). With this
observation, the statement in Lemma 4 follows by an induction on the structure
of derivatives(PS). We now prove Theorem 1.
Proof (of Theorem 1). Consider a reachable marking of PN [[PFC ]] with k tokens
on place [F ]. It corresponds to a reachable process Q ∈ Reach (PFC) with Q ≡
ΠkF | Q′ for some Q′ ∈ P. We show that #∩(PFC) ≥ k.
According to Lemma 3, Q ≡ νc˜.(Q1σ1 | . . . | Qmσm) and thus, by trans-
itivity, ΠkF | Q′ ≡ νc˜.(Q1σ1 | . . . | Qmσm). With Lemma 2 it follows that(
ΠkF | Q′
)
ν
≡̂ (νc˜.(Q1σ1 | . . . | Qmσm))ν . The application of Lemma 1 yields
(F )ν = F , and so we conclude(
ΠkF | Q′
)
ν
= ΠkF | (Q′)ν ≡̂Πi∈IGi = (νc˜.(Q1σ1 | . . . | Qmσm))ν
for a suitable set of fragments Gi.
By definition of ≡̂ , for every F there is a Gi such that F ≡ Gi. W.l.o.g.,
let these Gi be G1, . . . , Gk. Since all F are structurally congruent, we have
G1 ≡ . . . ≡ Gk.
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By definition of the restricted form, Gi ≡ νc˜i.(Πi∈IGiQiσi), where ∅ 6= IGi ⊆
{1, . . . ,m} and IGi ∩ IGj = ∅ for i 6= j. Non-emptyness follows from the fact
that fragments are not structurally congruent to 0, disjointness from the fact that
every sequential process Qiσi belongs to exactly one fragment. The identifiers
are preserved by structural congruence:
ident(Gi) = ident(νc˜i.(Πi∈IGiQiσi)) =
⋃
i∈IGi
ident(Qiσi) =
⋃
i∈IGi
ident(Qi).
The second equality holds due to the definition of ident , and the third because
of the invariance of ident under substitution. Again, as G1 ≡ . . . ≡ Gk and the
identifiers are preserved by structural congruence, we have ident(G1) = . . . =
ident(Gk), which means⋃
i∈IG1
ident(Qi) = . . . =
⋃
i∈IGk
ident(Qi). (1)
Consider a process Qi1 with i1 ∈ IG1 . As the processes are different from 0, it
contains an identifier KS ∈ ident(Qi1). With Equality (1), there are processes
Qi2 with i2 ∈ IG2 up to Qik with ik ∈ IGk such that KS ∈ ident(Qij ) for all
2 ≤ j ≤ k. By Lemma 4, for all j the inclusion ident(Qij ) ⊆ orb(PS inj (ij))
holds, where inj is the injection that exists due to Lemma 3. Combining both
arguments, we conclude orb(PS inj (i1)) ∩ . . . ∩ orb(PS inj (ik)) 6= ∅. As the index
sets IGi are pairwise disjoint and as inj is injective, all PS inj (ij) are distinct. We
therefore found k processes with intersecting orbits, #∩(PFC) ≥ k. ⊓⊔
In the case the orbits of all PS i in PFC = νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) are pairwise dis-
joint, Theorem 1 implies the safeness of the Petri net PN [[PFC ]]. In the following
section we show that every FCP can be translated into a bisimilar process with
disjoint orbits.
5 From FCPs to Safe Processes
Safe nets are a prerequisite to apply efficient unfolding-based verification tech-
niques. According to Theorem 1, the reason for non-safeness of the nets of arbit-
rary FCPs is the intersection of orbits. In this section we investigate a translation
of FCPs into their syntactic subclass called safe processes, where the sequential
processes comprising an FCP have pairwise disjoint orbits. The idea of translat-
ing PFC = νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) to the safe process Safe(PFC) is to create copies
of the process identifiers that are shared among several PS i, i.e., of those that
belong to several orbits. (The corresponding defining equations are duplicated
as well.) The intuition is that every PS i gets its own set of process identifiers
(together with the corresponding defining equations) which it can call during
system execution. Hence, due to Theorem 1, safe processes are mapped to safe
Petri nets.
The main result in this section states that the processes PFC and Safe(PFC)
are bisimilar, and, moreover, that the fragments are preserved in some sense.
Furthermore, the size of the specification Safe(PFC) is at most quadratic in the
size of PFC , and this translation is optimal.
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Definition 2. An FCP PFC = νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) is a safe process if the
orbits of all PS i are pairwise disjoint, i.e., for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : if i 6= j then
orb(PS i) ∩ orb(PS j) = ∅. ♦
To translate an FCP PFC = νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) into a safe process Safe(PFC),
we choose unique numbers for every sequential process, say i for PS i. We then
rename every process identifier K in the orbit of PS i to a fresh identifier K
i
using the unique number i. We use the functions renk : P → P, defined for
every k ∈ N by
renk(K)
df
= Kk
renk(K⌊a˜⌋)
df
= renk(K)⌊a˜⌋
renk(
∑
i∈I pii.Pi)
df
=
∑
i∈I pii.renk(Pi)
renk(P | Q)
df
= renk(P ) | renk(Q)
renk(νa.P )
df
= νa.renk(P ).
Employing the renk function, the translation of an FCP into a safe process is
defined as follows.
Definition 3. Let PFC = νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn). Then
Safe(PFC)
df
= νa˜.(ren1(PS1) | . . . | renn(PSn)),
where the defining equation of KkS is K
k
S(x˜) := renk(PS) if KS(x˜) := PS . The
original defining equations KS(x˜) := PS are then removed. ♦
We demonstrate the translation on our running example.
Example 4. Consider the FCP PFC = C ⌊url⌋ | C ⌊url⌋ | S⌊url⌋ in Example 1.
The translation is Safe(PFC) = C
1⌊url⌋ | C 2⌊url⌋ | S 3⌊url⌋, where
C 1(url) := νip.url〈ip〉.ip(s).s(x).C 1⌊url⌋
C 2(url) := νip.url〈ip〉.ip(s).s(x).C 2⌊url⌋
S 3(url) := url(y).νses.y〈ses〉.ses〈ses〉.S 3⌊url⌋.
The equations for C and S are removed. ♦
In the example, we just created another copy of the equation defining a client.
In fact, the following result shows that the size of the translated system is at
most quadratic in the size of the original specification. We measure the size of a
pi-Calculus process as the sum of the sizes of all the defining equations and the
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size of the main process, where3
size (K⌊a˜⌋)
df
= 1 + |a˜|
size (0)
df
= 1
size
(∑
i∈I 6=∅ pii.Pi
)
df
= 2|I| − 1 +
∑
i∈I size (Pi)
size (P | Q)
df
= 1 + size (P ) + size (Q)
size (νa.P )
df
= 1 + size (P )
size (K(x˜) := P )
df
= 1 + |x˜|+ size (P ) .
Note that in the rule for sums 2|I| − 1 was obtained by adding up the number
of prefixes of each process (|I|) and the number of separating pluses (|I| − 1).
Proposition 1 (Size). Let PFC = νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) be an FCP. Then
size(Safe(PFC)) ≤ n · size(PFC).
Proof. By definition, Safe(PFC)
df
= νa˜.(ren1(PS1) | . . . | ren1(PSn)). Con-
sider the renaming of PS i to reni(PS i). In the worst case, all definitions for
process identifiers in PFC are copied. This results in a specification of size at
most size(PFC) for every process PS i. When we translate PFC to Safe(PFC),
we rename n processes PS i. Therefore, the size of Safe(PFC) is bounded by
n · size(PFC). ⊓⊔
Note that since n ≤ size(PFC), this result shows that the size of Safe(PFC) is at
most quadratic in the size of PFC .
We now show that Safe(PFC) is a safe process. This ensures that Safe(PFC)
is mapped to a safe Petri net and justifies the name of the translation. The result
follows from the compatibility of the renaming function with the function orb.
Lemma 5. For every k ∈ N the equality orb(renk(P )) = renk(orb(P )) holds.
Applying this lemma immediately shows the safeness of Safe(PFC).
Proposition 2 (Safeness). Let PFC = νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) be an FCP. Then
Safe(PFC) is a safe process.
Proof. By definition, Safe(PFC)
df
= νa˜.(ren1(PS1) | . . . | renn(PSn)). We have to
show that the orbits are pairwise disjoint. Take distinct indices i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
By Lemma 5, the following equalities hold: orb(reni(PS i)) = reni(orb(PS i))
and orb(renj(PS j)) = renj(orb(PS j)). As the identifiers in reni(orb(PS i)) have
i as the superscript while those in renj(orb(PS j)) have j as the superscript
reni(orb(PS i)) ∩ renj(orb(PS j)) = ∅. ⊓⊔
3 All results in this section will be the same if the alternative definitions size (K⌊a˜⌋)
df
=
1 and size (K(x˜) := P )
df
= 1 + size (P ) are used instead.
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The translation of PFC into Safe(PFC) does not alter the behaviour of the pro-
cess: both processes are bisimilar with a meaningful bisimulation relation. This
relation shows that the processes reachable from PFC and Safe(PFC) coincide
up to the renaming of process identifiers. Thus, not only the behaviour of PFC is
preserved by Safe(PFC), but also the structure of the reachable process terms, in
particular their fragments. Technically, we define the relation Ri by (P,Q) ∈ Ri
iff there are names a˜ and sequential processes PS1, . . . , PSn, where the topmost
operator of each PS i is different from ν, such that
P ≡ νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) and Q ≡ νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | reni(PS i) | . . . | PSn).
Note that it is obvious from this definition that νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) and
νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | reni(PS i) | . . . | PSn) are related by Ri.
Theorem 2. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the relation Ri is a bisimulation that
relates the FCPs νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) and νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | reni(PS i) | . . . | PSn).
By transitivity of bisimulation, Theorem 2 allows for renaming several PS i and
still gaining a bisimilar process. In particular, renaming all n processes in PFC =
νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) yields the result for the safe system Safe(PFC).
Consider a process Q which is reachable from PFC . We argue that the struc-
ture of Q is essentially preserved (1) by the translation of PFC to the safe pro-
cess Safe(PFC) and then (2) by the translation of Safe(PFC) to the safe Petri
net PN [[Safe(PFC)]]. With this result we can reason about the structure of all
processes reachable from PFC using PN [[Safe(PFC)]].
According to Theorem 2, PFC and Safe(PFC) are bisimilar via the relation
R1 ◦ · · · ◦ Rn, e.g., a process Q = νa.νb.(H⌊a⌋ | K⌊a⌋ | L⌊b⌋) reachable from
PFC corresponds to a processQ
′ = νa.νb.(H1⌊a⌋ | K2⌊a⌋ | L3⌊b⌋) reachable from
Safe(PFC). Hence, one can reconstruct the fragments of Q using the fragments of
Q′. To see this, compute the restricted forms: (Q)ν = νa.(H⌊a⌋ | K⌊a⌋) | νb.L⌊b⌋
and (Q′)ν = νa.(H
1⌊a⌋ | K2⌊a⌋) | νb.L3⌊b⌋. Dropping the superscripts in (Q′)ν
yields the fragments in (Q)ν . This is due to the fact that only the restricted
names influence the restricted form of a process, not the process identifiers.
The transition systems of Safe(PFC) and PN [[Safe(PFC)]] are isomorphic, and
a reachable process Q′ ≡ νa.νb.(H1⌊a⌋ | K2⌊a⌋ | L3⌊b⌋) corresponds to the
marking M = {
[
νa.(H1⌊a⌋ | K2⌊a⌋)
]
,
[
νb.L3⌊b⌋
]
} [Mey07, Theorem 1]. Thus,
from a marking of PN [[Safe(PFC)]] one can obtain the restricted form of a reach-
able process in Safe(PFC), which in turn corresponds to the restricted form in
PFC (when the superscripts of process identifiers are dropped). Furthermore,
the bisimulation between PFC and PN [[Safe(PFC)]] allows one to reason about
the behaviour of PFC using PN [[Safe(PFC)]]. (This bisimulation follows from the
bisimulation between PFC and Safe(PFC) and the isomorphism of the transition
systems of Safe(PFC) and PN [[Safe(PFC)]]).
We discuss our choice to rename all PS i in νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) to gain
a safe process. One might be tempted to improve our translation by renaming
only a subset of processes PS i whose orbits intersect with many others, in hope
to get a smaller specification than Safe(PFC). We show that this idea does not
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work, and the resulting specification will be of the same size, i.e., our definition
of Safe(PFC) is optimal. First, we illustrate this issue with an example.
Example 5. Let P = τ.K⌊a˜⌋ + τ.L⌊a˜⌋, R = τ.K⌊a˜⌋ and S = τ.L⌊a˜⌋, where
K(x˜) := Def 1 and L(x˜) := Def 2. Consider the process P | R | S. The orbits of
P and R as well as the orbits of P and S intersect.
The renaming of P yields ren1(P ) | R | S = τ.K1⌊a˜⌋+τ.L1⌊a˜⌋ | R | S, where
K and L are defined above and K1(x˜) := ren1(Def 1), L
1(x˜) := ren1(Def 2). This
means we create additional copies of the shared identifiers K and L.
The renaming of R and S yields the process P | ren1(R) | ren2(S) =
P | τ.K1⌊a˜⌋ | τ.L2⌊a˜⌋, where we create new defining equations for the iden-
tifiers K1 and L2. The size of our translation is the same. ♦
This illustrates that any renaming of processes PS i where the orbits overlap
results in a specification of the same size. To render this intuition precisely, we
call KkS(x˜) := renk(PS) a copy of the equation KS(x˜) := PS , for any k ∈ N. We
also count KS(x˜) := PS as a copy of itself.
Proposition 3 (Necessary condition for safeness). The number of copies
of an equation KS(x˜) := PS necessary to get a safe process from PFC equals to
the number of orbits that contain KS .
Proof. Let PFC = νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn). If there are less copies of the equation
KS(x˜) := PS than orbits containing KS , by the pigeonhole principle there are at
least two orbits renk(PS i) and renk(PS j) sharing one identifierK
k
S . By definition,
the resulting process is not safe. If there are more copies than intersecting orbits,
some identifiers do not belong to any orbit. Every process reni(PS i) only calls
the identifiers in its orbit, i.e., KiS ∈ orb(reni(PS i)). The remaining K
j
S that
do not belong to any orbit are never used, and so the corresponding equations
KjS(x˜) := renj(PS) can be removed from the specification. ⊓⊔
Now we show that our translation provides precisely this minimal number of
copies of defining equations for every identifier, i.e., that it is optimal.
Proposition 4 (Optimality of our translation). Our translation Safe(PFC)
provides as many copies of a defining equation KS(x˜) := PS as there are orbits
containing KS .
Proof. Let PFC = νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) and let the identifier KS be contained
in k orbits, w.l.o.g., KS ∈ orb(PS1) ∩ . . . ∩ orb(PSk). By the definition of Safe,
we rename PS i to reni(PS i). As KS is in the orbit of PS i, the new identifier
KiS is in the orbit of reni(PS i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The defining equations are
KiS(x˜) := reni(PS) where KS(x˜) := PS . As KS is not contained in any other
orbit, no further copies of KS(x˜) := PS are added. Thus, we have k copies of the
defining equation KS(x˜) := PS . By definition, we remove the original equation
and get the equality. ⊓⊔
Remark 1. Note that one can, in general, optimise the translation by performing
some dynamic (rather than syntactic) analysis, and produce a smaller process
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whose corresponding Petri net is safe; however, our notion of a safe process is
syntactic rather than dynamic, and so the resulting process will not be safe
according to our definition.
In future, we plan to investigate less restrictive conditions which still guar-
antee the safeness of the final Petri net. Note that in order to distinguish two
structurally congruent fragments, it is enough to have one identifier which is
different in them. Our current approach renames all identifiers in a fragment,
which may unnecessarily increase the size of the resulting Petri net. For example,
consider the FCP νb.νc.(a(x).K⌊x⌋ | a(x).K⌊x⌋ | a〈b〉.L⌊b⌋ | a〈c〉.L⌊c⌋). After
two communications, there are two tokens on the place [νb.(K⌊b⌋ | L⌊b⌋)]. To
get a safe net, two copies of K (resulting in two places
[
νa.(K1⌊a⌋ | L⌊a⌋)
]
and[
νa.(K2⌊a⌋ | L⌊a⌋)
]
) are sufficient (even though the renamed FCP is not a safe
process, the final Petri net is safe). In contrast, our current technique creates
four places. The reason is that we do not know a priori to which fragment a
process will belong and whether we need to rename its identifiers. A more elab-
orate analysis might try to take this into account; it could also consider free
names, which, like process identifiers, are invariant under structural congruence
and could be used to distinguish fragments. ♦
6 Net Unfoldings
A finite and complete unfolding prefix of a bounded Petri net Υ is a finite acyc-
lic net which implicitly represents all the reachable states of Υ together with
transitions enabled at those states. Intuitively, it can be obtained through un-
folding Υ , by successive firing of transitions, under the following assumptions:
(i) for each new firing a fresh transition (called an event) is generated; (ii) for
each newly produced token a fresh place (called a condition) is generated. For
example, a finite and complete prefix of the Petri net in Figure 1(b) is shown in
Figure 2(a). Due to its structural properties (such as acyclicity), the reachable
states of Υ can be represented using configurations of its unfolding. A configura-
tion C is a downward-closed set of events (being downward-closed means that if
e ∈ C and f is a causal predecessor of e then f ∈ C) without choices (i.e., for all
distinct events e, f ∈ C, •e ∩ •f = ∅). For example, in the prefix shown in Fig-
ure 2(a), {e1, e2, e4} is a configuration, whereas {e1, e2, e6} and {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5}
are not (the former does not include e4, which is a predecessor of e6, while the
latter contains a choice between e4 and e5). Intuitively, a configuration is a par-
tially ordered execution, i.e., an execution where the order of firing of some of its
events (viz. concurrent ones) is not important; e.g., the configuration {e1, e2, e4}
corresponds to two totally ordered executions reaching the same final marking:
e1e2e4 and e2e1e4. Since a configuration can correspond to multiple executions, it
is often much more efficient in model checking to explore configurations rather
than executions. We will denote by [e] the local configuration of an event e,
i.e., the smallest (w.r.t. ⊆) configuration containing e (it is comprised of e and
its causal predecessors).
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The unfolding is infinite whenever the original Υ has an infinite run; however,
since Υ is bounded and hence has only finitely many reachable states, the un-
folding eventually starts to repeat itself and can be truncated (by identifying a
set of cut-off events) without loss of information, yielding a finite and complete
prefix. Intuitively, an event e can be declared cut-off if the already built part
of the prefix contains a configuration Ce (called the corresponding configuration
of e) such that its final marking coincides with that of [e] and Ce is smaller than
[e] w.r.t. some well-founded partial order on the configurations of the unfolding,
called an adequate order [ERV02].
Efficient algorithms exist for building such prefixes [ERV02,Kho03], which
ensure that the number of non-cut-off events in a complete prefix never exceeds
the number of reachable states of the original Petri net. Moreover, complete
prefixes are often exponentially smaller than the corresponding state graphs,
especially for highly concurrent Petri nets, because they represent concurrency
directly rather than by multidimensional interleaving ‘diamonds’ as it is done
in state graphs. For example, if the original Petri net consists of 100 transitions
which can fire once in parallel, the state graph will be a 100-dimensional hy-
percube with 2100 vertices, whereas the complete prefix will coincide with the
net itself. Also, one can observe that if the example in Figure 1(b) is scaled up
(by increasing the number of clients), the size of the prefix is linear in the num-
ber of clients, even though the number of reachable states grows exponentially.
Thus, unfolding prefixes significantly alleviate the state space explosion in many
practical cases.
A fundamental property of a finite and complete prefix is that each reachable
marking of Υ is a final marking of some configuration C (without cut-offs) of the
prefix, and, conversely, the final marking of each configuration C of the prefix is a
reachable marking in Υ . Thus various reachability properties of Υ (e.g., marking
and sub-marking reachability, fireability of a transition, mutual exclusion of a
set of places, deadlock, and many others) can be restated as the corresponding
properties of the prefix, and then checked, often much more efficiently.
Most of ‘interesting’ problems for safe Petri nets arePSpace-complete [Esp98],
but the same problems for prefixes are often in NP or even P. (Though the size
of a finite and complete unfolding prefix can be exponential in the size of the
original Petri net, in practice it is often relatively small, as explained above.)
A reachability property of Υ can easily be reformulated for a prefix, and then
translated into some canonical problem, e.g., Boolean satisfiability (SAT). Then
an off-the-shelf solver can be used for efficiently solving it. Such a combination
‘unfolder & solver’ turns out to be quite powerful in practice [KKY04].
6.1 Unfolding-Based Model Checking
This paper concentrates on the following approach to model checking. First,
a finite and complete prefix of the Petri net unfolding is built, and it is then
used for constructing a Boolean formula encoding the model checking problem
at hand. (It is assumed that the property being checked is the unreachability of
some ‘bad’ states, e.g., deadlocks.) This formula is unsatisfiable iff the property
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c1p1
c2p2
c3p3
e1
t1
e2
t2
e3
t3
c4
p4
c5
p5
c6
p6
e4
t4
e5
t5
c7
p7
c8
p8
e6
t6
e7
t7
c9
p9
c10
p10
e8
t8
e9
t9
c11 p1
c10 p2
c13 p2
c14 p3
(a)
(¬confe4∨confe1)∧(¬confe4∨confe2)∧(¬confe5∨confe2)∧(¬confe5∨confe3)∧
(¬confe6∨confe4)∧(¬confe7∨confe5)∧(¬confe4∨¬confe5) .
(b)
confe1∧confe2∧confe3∧(¬confe1∨¬confe2∨confe4∨confe5)∧(¬confe2∨¬confe3∨
confe4∨confe5)∧(¬confe4∨confe6)∧(¬confe5∨confe7)∧¬confe6∧¬confe7 .
(c)
Fig. 2. A finite and complete unfolding prefix of the Petri net in Figure 1(b) (a), the
corresponding configuration constraint CONF (b), and the corresponding violation
constraint VIOL expressing the deadlock condition (c).
holds, and such that any satisfying assignment to its variables yields a trace
violating the property being checked.
Typically such a formula would have for each non-cut-off event e of the prefix
a variable confe (the formula might also contain other variables). For every
satisfying assignment A, the set of events C
df
= {e | confe = 1} is a configuration
whose final marking violates the property being checked. The formula often has
the form CONF ∧ VIOL. The role of the property-independent configuration
constraint CONF is to ensure that C is a configuration of the prefix (not just
an arbitrary set of events). CONF can be defined as the conjunction of the
formulae∧
e∈E\Ecut
∧
f∈••e
(¬confe ∨ conff ) and
∧
e∈E\Ecut
∧
f∈Che
(¬confe ∨ ¬conff ) ,
where Che
df
= {((•e)•\{e})\Ecut} is the set of non-cut-off events which are in the
direct choice relation with e. The former formula is basically a set of implications
ensuring that if e ∈ C then its immediate predecessors are also in C, i.e., C is
downward closed. The latter one ensures that C contains no choices. CONF is
given in the conjunctive normal form (CNF) as required by most SAT solvers.
For example, the configuration constraint for the prefix in Figure 2(a) is shown
in part (b) of this figure.
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The role of the property-dependent violation constraint VIOL is to express
the property violation condition for a configuration C, so that if a configuration C
satisfying this constraint is found then the property does not hold, and C can be
translated into a violation trace. For example, for the deadlock condition VIOL
can be defined as ∧
e∈E
( ∨
f∈••e
¬conff ∨
∨
f∈(•e)•\Ecut
conff
)
.
This formula requires for each event e (including cut-off events) that some event
in ••e has not fired or some of the non-cut-off events (including e unless it is cut-
off) consuming tokens from •e has fired, and thus e is not enabled. This formula
is given in the CNF. For example, the violation constraint for the deadlock
checking problem formulated for the prefix in Figure 2(a) is shown in part (c) of
this figure.
7 Experimental Results
To demonstrate the practicality of our approach, we implemented the translation
of pi-Calculus to Petri nets discussed in Section 3 and the translation of FCPs
to safe processes presented in Section 5. In this section, we apply our tool chain
to check three series of benchmarks for deadlocks. We compare the results with
other well-known approaches and tools for pi-Calculus verification.
The NESS example models an electronic coursework submission system.4
This series of benchmarks is taken from [KKN06], where the only other unfolding-
based verification technique for the pi-Calculus is presented. The approach de-
scribed in [KKN06] is limited to the finite pi-Calculus, a subset of pi-Calculus
allowing to express only finite behaviours. It translates finite pi-Calculus terms
into high-level Petri nets and model checks the latter. The translation into Petri
nets used in [KKN06] is very different from our approach, and a high-level net
unfolder is used there for verification, while our technique uses the standard un-
folding procedure for safe low-level nets. Moreover, our technique is not limited
to the finite pi-Calculus.
The model consists of a teacher process T composed in parallel with k stu-
dents S (the system can be scaled up by increasing the number of students)
and an environment process ENV . Every student has its own local channel for
communication, hi, and all students share the channel h. The system is modelled
by the FCP
νh.νh1. . . . νhk.(T⌊nessc, h1, . . . , hk⌋ | Π
k
i=1S⌊h, hi⌋ | ENV ⌊nessc⌋) .
The idea is that the students are supposed to submit their work for assessment
to NESS . The teacher passes the channel nessc of the system to all students,
hi〈nessc〉, and then waits for the confirmation that they have finished working
on the assignment, hi(x). After receiving the ness channel, hi(nsc), students
organise themselves in pairs. To do so, they send their local channel hi on h and
4 Called NESS in Newcastle.
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at the same time listen on h to receive a partner, h〈hi〉 . . .+h(x) . . .. When they
finish, exactly one student of each pair sends two channels to the support system,
nsc〈hi〉.nsc〈x〉, which give access to their completed joint work. These channels
are received by the ENV process. The students finally notify the teacher about
the completion of their work, hi〈fin〉. Thus, the system is modelled by:
T (nessc, h1, . . . , hk) :=Π
k
i=1hi〈nessc〉.hi(xi).0
S (h, hi) :=hi(nsc).(h〈hi〉.hi〈fin〉.0+
h(x).nsc〈hi〉.nsc〈x〉.hi〈fin〉.0)
ENV (nessc) :=nessc(y1). . . . .nessc(yk).0.
In the following Table 1, the row nsk gives the verification results for the NESS
system with k ∈ N students. The property we verified was whether all processes
successfully terminate by reaching the end of their individual code (as distin-
guished from a deadlock where some processes are stuck in the middle of their
intended behaviour, waiting for a communication to occur). Obviously, the sys-
tem successfully terminates iff the number of students is even, i.e., they can be
organised into pairs. The dnsk entries refer to a refined NESS model where the
pairing of students is deterministic; thus the number of students is even, and
these benchmarks are deadlock-free.
The second example is the client-server system similar to our running ex-
ample. For a more realistic model, we extend the server to spawn separate ses-
sions that handle the clients’ requests. We change the server process in Sec-
tion 2.1 to a more concurrent CONCS and add separate session processes:
CONCS (url , getses) := url(y).getses(s).y〈s〉.CONCS⌊url , getses⌋
SES (getses) := νses.getses〈ses〉.ses〈ses〉.SES⌊getses⌋.
On a client’s request, the server creates a new session object using the getses
channel, getses(s). A session object is modelled by a SES process. It sends its
private channel νses along the getses channel to the server. The server forwards
the session to the client, y〈s〉, which establishes the private session, and becomes
available for further requests. This case study uses recursion and is scalable in
the number of clients and the number of sessions. In Table 2, e.g., the entry
5s5c gives the verification results for the system with five SES processes, five C
processes and one server. All these benchmarks are deadlock-free.
The last example is the well-known specification of the handover procedure in
the GSM Public Land Mobile Network. We use the standard pi-Calculus model
with one mobile station, two base stations, and one mobile switching center
presented in [OP92].
We compare our results with three other techniques for pi-Calculus verifica-
tion: the mentioned approach in [KKN06], the verification kit HAL [FGMP03],
and the mobility workbench (MWB) [VM94]. HAL translates a pi-Calculus pro-
cess into a history dependent automaton (HDA) [Pis99]. This in turn is trans-
lated into a finite automaton which is checked using standard tools. The MWB
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FCP HLNet Model Checking mwb hal Struct Safe Struct Model Checking
Mod. Size |P| |T| unf |B| |E∗| sat dl pi2fc |P| |T| B Size |P| |T| unf |B| |E∗| sat
dns4 84 1433 511 6 10429 181 < 1 10 93 22 47 8 98 32 50 < 1 113 38 < 1
dns6 123 3083 1257 46 28166 342 < 1 - - 32 94 12 145 48 99 < 1 632 159 < 1
dns8 162 5357 2475 354 58863 551 < 1 - - 42 157 16 192 64 164 < 1 3763 745 < 1
dns10 201 8255 4273 - - - 52 236 20 271 80 239 1 22202 3656 2
dns12 240 11777 6791 - - - 62 331 24 324 96 286 56 128295 18192 62
ns2 61 157 200 1 5553 127 < 1 < 1 < 1 18 28 4 67 26 40 < 1 61 27 < 1
ns3 88 319 415 7 22222 366 < 1 1 8 37 91 6 98 56 141 < 1 446 153 < 1
ns4 115 537 724 69 101005 1299 1 577 382 68 229 8 129 102 364 < 1 5480 1656 < 1
ns5 142 811 1139 532 388818 4078 58 - - 119 511 10 160 172 815 17 36865 7832 3
ns6 169 1141 1672 - - - 206 1087 12 191 282 1722 1518 377920 65008 84
ns7 196 1527 2335 - - - 361 2297 14 222 646 3605 -
ns2-r 61 n/a n/a 16 24 4 67 24 36 < 1 51 22 < 1
ns3-r 88 n/a n/a 29 70 6 98 48 117 < 1 292 99 < 1
ns4-r 113 n/a n/a 45 123 8 127 79 216 < 1 1257 392 < 1
ns5-r 140 n/a n/a 66 241 10 158 119 435 2 10890 2635 1
ns6-r 167 n/a n/a 91 418 12 189 167 768 123 107507 19892 31
ns7-r 194 n/a n/a 120 666 14 220 223 1239 -
Table 1. Experimental results I.
does not use any automata translation, but builds the state space of a process
on the fly. These tools can verify various properties, but we perform our experi-
ments for deadlock checking only, as it is the common denominator of all these
tools.
We briefly comment on the role of the models with the suffix −r in Table 1.
One can observe that parallel compositions inside a fragment lead to interleav-
ing ‘diamonds’ in our Petri net representation. Thus, restricted names that are
known to a large number of processes can make the size of our Petri net trans-
lation grow exponentially. We demonstrate this effect by verifying some of the
NESS benchmarks with and without (suffix −r in the table) the restrictions
on such critical names. Even with the critical restrictions our approach outper-
forms the other tools; but when such restrictions are removed, it becomes orders
of magnitude faster. (Removing such critical restrictions does not alter the pro-
cess behaviour: νa.P can evolve into νa.P ′ iff P can evolve into P ′; thus, one
can replace νa.P by P for model checking purposes.)
The columns in Tables 1 and 2 are organised as follows. FCP Size gives the
size of the process as defined in Section 5. The following two columns, HLNet
and Model Checking (present only in Table 1), are the verification results when
the approach in [KKN06] is applied. In the former column, |P | and |T | state the
number of places and transitions in the high-level Petri net. The following column
unf gives the time to compute the unfolding prefix of this net. (We measure all
runtimes in seconds.) For this prefix, |B| is the number of conditions, and |E∗|
is the number of events (excluding cut-offs). Like our technique, the [KKN06]
employs a SAT solver whose runtime is given by sat. The following two columns,
mwb dl and hal pi2fc, give the runtimes for the deadlock checking algorithm
in MWB and for converting a pi-Calculus process into a finite automaton (via
HDA). This time includes the translation of a pi-Calculus process into an HDA,
minimisation of this HDA, and the conversion of the minimised HDA into a finite
automaton [FGMP03]. The remaining entries are the results of applying our
model checking procedure. The column Struct gives the numbers of places and
transitions and the bounds of the Petri nets corresponding to a direct translation
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FCP mwb hal Struct Safe Struct Model Checking
Model Size dl pi2fc |P| |T| B Size |P| |T| unf |B| |E∗| sat
gsm 194 - 18 374 138 1 194 148 344 < 1 345 147 < 1
gsm-r 194 n/a n/a 60 72 1 194 75 110 < 1 150 72 < 1
1s1c 44 - < 1 11 13 1 44 12 15 < 1 17 9 < 1
1s2c 47 - 6 12 15 2 58 22 30 < 1 35 17 < 1
2s1c 47 - 2 20 31 2 56 22 35 < 1 37 18 < 1
2s2c 50 - 138 31 59 2 70 40 66 < 1 73 33 < 1
3s2c 53 - - 68 159 3 82 66 128 < 1 137 57 < 1
3s3c 56 - - 85 217 3 96 100 194 < 1 216 87 < 1
4s4c 63 - - 362 1202 4 122 216 484 < 1 537 195 < 1
5s5c 68 - - 980 3818 5 148 434 1132 < 1 1238 403 < 1
Table 2. Experimental results II.
of the FCPs. These nets are given only for comparison, and are not used for
model checking. Safe Size gives the size of the safe process computed by the
function Safe in Definition 3, and the next column gives the numbers of places
and transitions of the corresponding safe Petri nets. Note that these nets, unlike
those in [KKN06], are the usual low-level Petri nets. The following columns give
the unfolding times, the prefix sizes, and the times for checking deadlocks on the
prefixes using a SAT solver. A ‘−’ in the tables indicates the corresponding tool
did not produce an output within 30 minutes, and an ‘n/a’ means the technique
was not applicable to the example.
Table 1 illustrates the results for checking the NESS example with the differ-
ent techniques. As the MWB requires processes where all names are restricted,
we cannot check the −r versions of the case studies. Our runtimes are by orders
of magnitude smaller in comparison with HAL and MWB , and are much bet-
ter compared with the approach in [KKN06]. Furthermore, they dramatically
improve when the critical names are removed (the −r models).
The approach in [KKN06] only applies to the finite pi-Calculus, so one cannot
check the client-server or the GSM benchmarks with that technique. Table 2
shows that the proposed technique dramatically outperforms both MWB and
HAL, and handles the benchmark with five sessions and five clients within a
second.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed a practical approach for verification of finite
control processes. It works by first translating the given FCP into a safe process,
and then translating the latter into a safe Petri net for which unfolding-based
model checking is performed. Our translation to safe processes exploits a general
boundedness result for FCP nets based on the theory of orbits. Our experiments
show that this approach has a significant advantage over other existing tools for
verification of mobile systems in terms of memory consumption and runtime. We
plan to further develop this approach, and below we identify potential directions
for future research.
One can observe that after the translation into a safe process, some fragments
differ only by the replicated process identifiers. Such fragments are equivalent in
the sense that they react in the same way and generate equivalent places in the
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postsets of the transitions. Hence, it should be possible to optimise our transla-
tion procedure, because many structural congruence checks can be omitted and
several computations of enabled reactions become unnecessary. Moreover, this
observation allows one to use in the unfolding procedure a weaker (compared
with the equality of final markings) equivalence on configurations, as explained
in [Kho03, Section 2.5]. This would produce cut-off events more often and hence
reduce the size of the unfolding prefix.
It seems to be possible to generalise our translation to a wider subclass of pi-
Calculus. For example, consider the process S⌊url⌋ | C ⌊url⌋ | C ⌊url⌋ modelling
a concurrent server and two clients, with the corresponding process identifiers
defined as
S (url) := url(y).(νses.y〈ses〉.ses〈ses〉.0 | S⌊url⌋)
C (url) := νip.url〈ip〉.ip(s).s(x).C ⌊url⌋.
Intuitively, when contacted by a client, the server spawns a new session and
is ready to serve another client, i.e., several clients can be served in parallel.
Though this specification is not an FCP, it still results in a 2-bounded Petri
net very similar to the one in Figure 1(a), and our method can still be used to
convert it into a safe Petri net for subsequent verification.
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A Proofs for Section 4
Proof (of Lemma 3). We prove the claim for Q ∈ Reach (P ) via an induction on
the length of the reaction sequences. The base case is the empty sequence, i.e.,
Q0 = PFC = νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn). If the first operator of PS i is a restriction,
PS i = νa˜i.PS
′
i with PS
′
i = KS⌊a˜⌋ or PS
′
i = Σj∈J 6=∅pij .QS j , we apply the scope
extrusion rule. This yields νa˜.a˜′1. . . . .a˜
′
n.(PS
′
1{a˜
′
1/a˜1} | . . . | PS
′
n{a˜
′
n/a˜n}), where
the names in a˜i are renamed to the fresh names a˜
′
i to prevent name clashes.
With the identity we get the required injection. Of course, PS
′
i ∈ der(PS i) ⊆
derivatives(PS i).
Let Qn ≡ νc˜.(R1σ1 | . . . | Rmσm) such that Ri ∈ derivatives(PS inj (i))
for a suitable injection inj : {1, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . , n} and σi : fn (Ri) → c˜ ∪
fn (PFC). We consider Qn → Qn+1 via a communication between R1σ1 and
R2σ2. The consumption of a τ prefix is similar. We comment on the call to a
process identifier KS with KS(x˜) := 0.
W.l.o.g., let R1 be the sending process, R1σ1 = x1σ1〈y1σ1〉.R
′
1σ1 +M1σ1 =
a〈b〉.R′1σ1+M1σ1 and R2σ2 = x2σ2(y2).R
′
2σ2+M2σ2 = a(y2).R
′
2σ2+M2σ2. We
get the reaction R1σ1 | R2σ2 → R
′
1σ1 | R
′
2σ2{y1σ1/y2}. Thus, for Qn we derive
Qn → νc˜.(R
′
1σ1 | R
′
2σ2{y1σ1/y2} | Π
m
i=3Riσi)
df
= Qn+1. We transform Qn+1 into
the required form.
As R1 ∈ derivatives(PS inj (1)) by the hypothesis and as PS inj (1) is sequential,
R1 is a sequential process. Hence, R
′
1 is sequential as well, R
′
1 = νc˜1.RS1 where
RS1 = KS⌊a˜⌋ or RS1 = Σj∈J 6=∅pij .QS j . Similarly, R
′
2 = νc˜2.RS2. We compute
Qn+1 = ( Definition of Qn+1 )
νc˜.(R′1σ1 | R
′
2σ2{y1σ1/y2} | Π
m
i=3Riσi)
= ( Form of R′1 and R
′
2 )
νc˜.((νc˜1.RS1)σ1 | (νc˜2.RS2)σ2{y1σ1/y2} | Π
m
i=3Riσi)
= ( Application of substitution )
νc˜.(νc˜1.(RS1σ1) | νc˜2.(RS2σ2{y1σ1/y2}) | Π
m
i=3Riσi)
≡ ( α-conversion to fresh names c˜′1 and c˜
′
2 )
νc˜.(νc˜′1.(RS1σ1){c˜
′
1/c˜1} | νc˜
′
2.(RS2σ2{y1σ1/y2}){c˜
′
2/c˜2} | Π
m
i=3Riσi)
≡ ( Scope extrusion )
νc˜.c˜′1.c˜
′
2.(RS1σ1{c˜
′
1/c˜1} | RS2σ2{y1σ1/y2}{c˜
′
2/c˜2} | Π
m
i=3Riσi)
= ( σ′1
df
= σ1{c˜′1/c˜1}, σ
′
2
df
= σ2{y1σ1/y2}{c˜′2/c˜2} )
νc˜.c˜′1.c˜
′
2.(RS1σ
′
1 | RS2σ
′
2 | Π
m
i=3Riσi).
By the hypothesis, R1 ∈ derivatives(PS inj (1)). By the definition of derivatives we
get der(R1) ⊆ derivatives(PS inj (1)). AsR1 = x1〈y1〉.R
′
1+M1 = x1〈y1〉.νc˜1.RS1+
M1, we get RS1 ∈ der(R1). Similarly we conclude that RS2 ∈ der(R2).
The ranges of σ′1,2 remain to be checked. Consider σ
′
2 = σ2{y1σ1/y2}{c˜
′
2/c˜2}.
By the hypothesis σ2 maps a name into c˜∪ fn (PFC). The name y2 is not changed
by σ2 as it was bound in R1 and we assume bound names and names in sub-
stitutions to be disjoint. It is mapped to y1σ1 which is in c˜ ∪ fn (PFC) by the
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hypothesis for σ1. The names in c˜2 were restricted in R1. Thus, they are different
(1) from y2 as a name is bound at most once by the assumption and (2) from the
names changed by σ2 as bound names and names in substitutions are disjoint.
Names in c˜2 are mapped to c˜
′
2 ⊆ c˜ ∪ c˜
′
1 ∪ c˜
′
2 ∪ fn (PFC). Thus, the range of σ
′
2 is
c˜ ∪ c˜′1 ∪ c˜
′
2 ∪ fn (PFC).
Consider the case R2σ2 = KS⌊x˜σ2⌋ with KS(x˜) := 0. We get the reaction
Qn → νc˜.(R1σ1 | Π
m
i=3Riσi)
df
= Qn+1. With the definition R
′
i
df
= Ri+1 and
σ′i
df
= σi+1 for i = 2, . . . ,m − 1 we change the indices. This yields Qn+1 =
νc˜.(R1σ1 | Π
m−1
i=2 R
′
iσ
′
i). The suitable injection inj
′ : {1, . . . ,m− 1} → {1, . . . , n}
is inj ′(1)
df
= inj (1) and inj ′(i)
df
= inj (i + 1) for i 6= 1. The demanded properties
hold by the hypothesis. This concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
As indicated in Section 4, we require the following Lemma 6 in the proof of
Lemma 4.
Lemma 6. For every process P ∈ P the following implication holds. If Q ∈
der(P ) then ident(Q) ⊆ ident(P ).
Proof. The case P = 0 is trivial. Consider P = K⌊a˜⌋. If Q ∈ der(P ), then
Q = K⌊a˜⌋. Thus ident(Q) = {K} ⊆ ident(P ).
Assume the implication holds for Pi, i ∈ I. Consider the choice compos-
ition
∑
i∈I 6=∅ pii.Pi. If Q ∈ der(
∑
i∈I 6=∅ pii.Pi) then either Q =
∑
i∈I 6=∅ pii.Pi
or Q ∈ der(Pi) for some i ∈ I. In the first case, we trivially have ident(Q) ⊆
ident(
∑
i∈I 6=∅ pii.Pi). In the second case, by the hypothesis, ident(Q) ⊆ ident(Pi).
By monotonicity, ident(Pi) ⊆
⋃
i∈I ident(Pi) = ident(
∑
i∈I 6=∅ pii.Pi). (The equal-
ity holds by the definition of ident .)
Assume the implication holds for P1 and P2. We consider the parallel compos-
ition P1 | P2. If Q ∈ der(P1 | P2) = der(P1)∪der(P2) then either Q ∈ der(P1) or
Q ∈ der(P2). W.l.o.g., Q ∈ der(P1). By the hypothesis, ident(Q) ⊆ ident(P1).
Of course, ident(P1) ⊆ ident(P1)∪ ident(P2), which equals ident(P1 | P2) by the
definition of ident .
For the case of restriction, we assume the implication holds for P . Then
Q ∈ der(νa.P ) = der(P ) implies ident(Q) ⊆ ident(P ) = ident(νa.P ) by the
hypothesis. This closes the induction. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Lemma 4). We prove the lemma by an induction on the structure of
derivatives(PS). If Q ∈ der(PS) then we have ident(Q) ⊆ ident(PS) ⊆ orb(PS).
The first inclusion holds by Lemma 6, the second by the definition of orb. This
proves the base case.
Let KS⌊a˜⌋ ∈ derivatives(PS), where KS(x˜) := QS . Assume we already
showed that ident(KS⌊a˜⌋) = {KS} ⊆ orb(PS). We have to show that for every
Q ∈ der(QS) we have ident(Q) ⊆ orb(PS). By Lemma 6, ident(Q) ⊆ ident(QS).
As KS ∈ orb(PS) by the hypothesis, we have ident(QS) ⊆ orb(PS) by the defin-
ition of orb. This closes the proof. ⊓⊔
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B Proofs for Section 5
We use the following Lemma 7 in the proof of Lemma 5. It states that the
functions ident and renk are compatible.
Lemma 7. ident(renk(P )) = renk(ident(P )).
Proof. In the base case, we have K⌊a˜⌋. With the definitions of renk and ident ,
we get ident(renk(K⌊a˜⌋)) = ident(K
k⌊a˜⌋) = {Kk}. We observe that {Kk} =
renk({K}) = renk(ident(K⌊a˜⌋)). The last equality holds with the definition of
ident .
For the induction step, assume the equality holds for Pi with i ∈ I. Then we
get in the case of choice composition
ident(renk(Σi∈Ipii.Pi))
( Definition renk ) = ident(Σi∈Ipii.renk(Pi))
( Definition ident ) =
⋃
i∈I ident(renk(Pi))
( Hypothesis ) =
⋃
i∈Irenk(ident(Pi))
( Applic. of renk to sets ) = renk(
⋃
i∈I ident(Pi))
( Definition ident ) = renk(ident(Σi∈Ipii.Pi)).
Assume the equality holds for P1 and P2. For the parallel composition we derive
ident(renk(P1 | P2))
( Definition renk ) = ident(renk(P1) | renk(P2))
( Definition ident ) = ident(renk(P1)) ∪ ident(renk(P2))
( Hypothesis ) = renk(ident(P1)) ∪ renk(ident(P2))
( Applic. of renk to sets ) = renk(ident(P1) ∪ ident(P2))
( Definition ident ) = renk(ident(P1 | P2)).
If the equality holds for P , then we get for the restriction
ident(renk(νa.P ))
( Definition renk ) = ident(νa.renk(P ))
( Definition ident ) = ident(renk(P ))
( Hypothesis ) = renk(ident(P ))
( Definition ident ) = renk(ident(νa.P )).
This closes the proof. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Lemma 5). We prove two inclusions, both by an induction on the
structure of orb(P ). We start with ⊆. Let Kk ∈ ident(renk(P )). By Lemma 7,
Kk ∈ renk(ident(P )) ⊆ renk(orb(P )). The inclusion holds as ident(P ) ⊆ orb(P )
by the definition of orb. This proves the base case.
Assume we showed for Kk ∈ orb(renk(P )) that Kk ∈ renk(orb(P )). This
means, there is K ∈ orb(P ) such that Kk = renk(K). Let the defining equa-
tion of K be K(x˜) := Q. By definition, Kk(x˜) := renk(Q). We have to show
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that ident(renk(Q)) ⊆ renk(orb(P )). By Lemma 7, we have ident(renk(Q)) =
renk(ident(Q)). Since K ∈ orb(P ), ident(Q) ⊆ orb(P ) by the definition of orb.
We conclude renk(ident(Q)) ⊆ renk(orb(P )).
To show the reverse inclusion, let Kk ∈ renk(ident(P )). With Lemma 7,
Kk ∈ ident(renk(P )) ⊆ orb(renk(P )). The inclusion holds by the definition of
orb. This proves the base case.
Assume for Kk ∈ renk(orb(P )) we have K
k ∈ orb(renk(P )). Since K
k ∈
renk(orb(P )) there is K ∈ orb(P ) with K
k = renk(K). Let K be defined
by K(x˜) := Q. We show renk(ident(Q)) ⊆ orb(renk(P )). We observe that
renk(ident(Q)) = ident(renk(Q)) by Lemma 7. By the hypothesis, we have
Kk ∈ orb(renk(P )). Moreover, K
k is defined as Kk(x˜) := renk(Q). Thus, by the
definition of orb, ident(renk(Q)) ⊆ orb(renk(P )). ⊓⊔
Lemma 8. renk(P )σ = renk(Pσ)
Proof. We prove the lemma by an induction on the structure of processes. Con-
sider K⌊a˜⌋. We have renk(K⌊a˜⌋)σ = Kk⌊a˜⌋σ = Kk⌊a˜σ⌋ = renk(K⌊a˜σ⌋). The
first and the last equality hold by the definition of renk, the second by the
definition of the application of σ.
Assume for Pi that renk(Pi)σ = renk(Piσ) holds. Then we have
renk(Σi∈Ipii.Pi)σ
( Definition renk ) = (Σi∈Ipii.renk(Pi))σ
( Applic. of subst. ) = Σi∈Ipiiσ.(renk(Pi)σ)
( Hypothesis ) = Σi∈Ipiiσ.renk(Piσ)
( Definition renk ) = renk(Σi∈Ipiiσ.Piσ)
( Applic. of subst. ) = renk((Σi∈Ipii.Pi)σ).
Assume the equality holds for P1 and P2, then we get
renk(P1 | P2)σ
( Definition renk ) = (renk(P1) | renk(P2))σ
( Applic of subst. ) = renk(P1)σ | renk(P2)σ
( Hypothesis ) = renk(P1σ) | renk(P2σ)
( Definition renk ) = renk(P1σ | P2σ)
( Applic. of subst. ) = renk((P1 | P2)σ).
Assume the equality holds for P , then we have
renk(νa.P )σ
( Definition renk ) = (νa.renk(P ))σ
( Applic. of subst. ) = νa.(renk(P )σ)
( Hypothesis ) = νa.renk(Pσ)
( Definition renk ) = renk(νa.(Pσ))
( Applic. of subst. ) = renk((νa.P )σ).
This closes the induction. ⊓⊔
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Proof (of Theorem 2). Of course, PFC and Safe(PFC) are related by Ri. We now
have to show that every reaction P → P ′ can be imitated by Q, i.e., Q→ Q′ such
that P ′ andQ′ are related byRi (and vice versa forQ→ Q′). As P is structurally
congruent with νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn), we have νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn) → P
′ by
Rule (Struct).
There are three possible reactions for the process νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn): some
PS i performs a τ action, PS i = τ.PS
′
i + Mi, some PS i is a process identifier
that calls its defining equation, PS i = KS⌊a˜⌋, or two processes PS i and PS j
communicate, PS i = a〈b〉.PS
′
i +Mi and PS j = a(x).PS
′
j +Mj . We consider the
latter case, i.e.,
νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PSn)
= νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | a〈b〉.PS
′
i +Mi | . . . | a(x).PS
′
j +Mj | . . . | PSn)
→ νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PS
′
i | . . . | PS
′
j{b/x} | . . . | PSn)
≡ P ′.
Structural congruence follows from the fact that Rule (Struct) allows for rewrit-
ing the process term. We have to show that Q → Q′ such that (P ′, Q′) ∈ Ri.
W.l.o.g., we assume that PS j is the process which is renamed, i.e.,
νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PS i | . . . | renj(PS j) | . . . | PSn)
= νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | a〈b〉.PS
′
i +Mi | . . . | renj(a(x).PS
′
j +Mj) | . . . | PSn)
= νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | a〈b〉.PS
′
i +Mi | . . . | a(x).renj(PS
′
j) + renj(Mj) | . . . | PSn)
→ νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PS
′
i | . . . | renj(PS
′
j){b/x} | . . . | PSn).
The second equality follows with the definition of renj . With Lemma 8 renaming
and substitution are compatible. Thus, we can pull the substitution inside the
renaming to continue the equality:
= νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PS
′
i | . . . | renj(PS
′
j{b/x}) | . . . | PSn)
df
= Q′.
To relate P ′ with Q′ by Ri, the topmost operators of PS
′
i and PS
′
j{b/x} need
to be different from ν. Assume PS
′
i = νa˜i.PS
′′
i , where either PS
′′
i = KS⌊a˜⌋ or
PS
′′
i = Σi∈I 6=∅pii.QS i. Similarly, let PS
′
j = νa˜j .PS
′′
j . With α-conversion of a˜i into
a˜′i and scope extrusion, it is immediate to derive
νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PS
′
i | . . . | PS
′
j{b/x} | . . . | PSn)
≡ νa˜.a˜′i.a˜
′
j .(PS1 | . . . | PS
′′
i {a˜
′
i/a˜i} | . . . | PS
′′
j {b/x}{a˜
′
j/a˜j} | . . . | PSn).
We treat νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PS
′
i | . . . | renj(PS
′
j{b/x}) | . . . | PSn) similarly to get
νa˜.(PS1 | . . . | PS
′
i | . . . | renj(PS
′
j{b/x}) | . . . | PSn)
≡ νa˜.a˜′i.a˜
′
j .(PS1 | . . . | PS
′′
i {a˜
′
i/a˜i} | . . . | renj(PS
′′
j {b/x}{a˜
′
j/a˜j}) | . . . | PSn).
Note that this again requires the compatibility of renaming and substitution. We
conclude (P ′, Q′) ∈ Ri. The immitation of reactions Q→ Q
′ by P is similar. ⊓⊔
